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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:

: Supreme Court No. 900479

ESTATE OF ANDERSON

: Priority 16

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant/Petitioner,

Charter Thrift

& Loan

(hereinafter

"Charter"), by and through its counsel of record, hereby submits
this brief.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

This appeal is taken pursuant to the of Rules 3 and 4,

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Supreme Court of the State
of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title 78-2-2,
Paragraph (3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
2.

This appeal is from an Order denying the Petition for

Allowance of Claims filed by the Appellant/Petitioner, Charter
Thrift & Loan, against the Appellee/Respondent, Estate of Glenn
Claughton Anderson, Jr.

1

STATEMENT OF I88UE8 PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was Charter Thrift & Loan, as a known creditor of an

estate entitled to notice of the commencement of the three (3)
month nonclaim period, after which claims are barred by the Utah
Nonclaim Statute?
2.

Is application of the Utah Nonclaim Statute to bar

Charter Thrift & Loan's claim, absent actual notice of the running
of the nonclaim period, a denial of due process under the United
States Constitution, Amendment XIV, and Utah Constitution, Article
1, §7, and therefore unconstitutional pursuant to the ruling of
Tulsa Professional Collection Services vs. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1540
(1988)?
The issues as presented are questions of law and are therefore
subject to review for correctness, without deference to the Trial
Court's legal conclusions. Barber vs. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P. 2d
248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ; Daniels vs. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass±n, 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Subsection 75-3-801 (1953), Utah Code Annotated:
Notice to Creditors. Unless notice has already been
given under this section, a personal representative upon
his appointment shall publish a notice once a week for
three successive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county announcing his appointment and
address and notifying creditors of the estate to present
their claims within three months after the date of the
first publication of the notice or be forever barred.
2

Subsection 75-3-801 (1989), Utah Code Annotated:
Notice to Creditors. Unless notice has already been
given under this section, a personal representative upon
his appointment shall publish a notice once a week for
three successive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county announcing the personal
representative's appointment and address and notifying
creditors of the estate to present their claims within
three months after the date of the first publication of
the notice, or be forever barred.
The personal
representative shall, after making reasonable efforts to
ascertain creditors of the estate, also mail such notice
on or before fourteen days after the date of first
publication to all then known creditors of the estate.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV §1:
[Citizenship-Due Process of Law-Equal Protection]. All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Const. Art. I, §7:
[Due Process of Law]. No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
On or about March 1, 1990, Charter filed its original claim
against the estate of Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., (hereinafter
The "Estate").

(P.2, f1). On or about April 19, 1990, Charter's

]

A11 references to the record are to page and paragraph
numbers of the Rule 11(f) Stipulated Statement of the Case.
3

Claim was disallowed by the Estate.

(P. 2, 112). On June 15, 1990,

Charter petitioned the District Court for allowance of its claim.
(P.2, 13).
Memoranda were submitted to the District Court.
6 and 7) .

(P.2, f4, 5,

On or about July 25, 1990, oral argument was heard by

the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson of the Third District Court.
(P.2, f8) . On or about September 4, 1990, Judge Wilkinson entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order Denying Charter's
Petition.

(P.2, f 9) . (A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and Order are attached hereto in the Appendix as Exhibit
f, ,f

A ) . Charter appeals the denial of its Petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., (hereinafter "Decedent"),

passed away on July 19, 1987, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
(P.3, fl).
2.

On or about August 12, 1987, probate proceedings were

commenced in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
for the probate of Decedent's will.
3.

(P.3, f2) .

Shelly J. Jones, daughter of the Decedent, was appointed

Personal Representative of the estate.
4.

(P.3, J[3) .

Commencing on or about September 4, 1987, the Personal

Representative caused a Notice to Creditors to be published for

4

three

(3)

consecutive

weeks,

in

accordance

with

Utah

Code

Annotated, §75-3-801 (1953) (P.3, 54).
5.

The Personal Representative had knowledge that Charter

Thrift & Loan was a creditor of the estate.
6.

(P.3, f5).

The Personal Representative personally contacted Charter

Thrift & Loan by telephone and informed it of her father's death,
and that a probate had been filed, and that she had been appointed
Personal Representative of her father's estate.
7.

(P.3, 116).

Appellant Charter Thrift & Loan did not have actual

notice of the publication of the Notice to Creditors.
8.

Charter Thrift & Loan was not given actual notice of the

running of the claim bar period.
9.

(P.3, 57).

(P.4, 58).

Charter Thrift & Loan did not file a Creditor's Claim

within the three (3) months of publication as required by Utah Code
Annotated, §75-3-801 (1953), and did not file a creditor's claim
until March 1, 1990.

(P.4, f 9) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Charter

was

known

by

the

Personal

Representative

as a

creditor of the estate of Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr. (P.3, f5).
Charter had actual knowledge of Mr. Anderson's death and notice
that a personal representative had been appointed.

(P.3, f6) .

However, Charter was never given notice by mail or any other means
as to impart actual notice to formally present its claims or be
5

barred.

(P.3 and 4, f7 and 8). Such notice is now required to be

given to known creditors under the standards set forth in Utah Code
Annotated, §75-3-801 (1989). The only notice to present claims was
published notice, as required by the aforementioned statute, as it
read in 1987 when notice was published.

That notice never came to

the attention of the petitioner, Charter Thrift & Loan.

(P.3, fl4).

The issue of the constitutionality of barring claims solely on
the basis of published notice has recently been ruled upon by the
Supreme Court of the United States.

The Supreme Court ruled, in

Tulsa Professional Collection Services vs. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340
(1988), that published notice was insufficient, under due process
standards, to trigger the time bar of the typical nonclaim statute
to known creditors.

The United State Supreme Court ruled that

reasonably ascertainable creditors were entitled to notice by mail
or other means equally certain to impart actual notice that claims
were due and would be barred if not presented in a timely manner.
After this decision, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah nonclaim
statute to include such a requirement.
In this matter, since the Personal Representative did not
attempt to notify Charter of the running of the claim bar period,
and since Charter did not have actual notice of the running of the
claim bar period; it was a denial of due process for the Trial
Court to deny Charter's Petition to Allow its Claim against the
6

estate based upon application of the time bar which was activated
solely by the published notice.
INTRODUCTION
The Deceased, Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., passed away on
July 19, 1987 (P.3, 51). Thereafter, Shelly Jones was appointed
Personal Representative of the Deceased's estate and a probate was
commenced (P.3, f3 and 6).

Charter became aware of the death and

that a Personal Representative had been appointed.

The Personal

Representative had knowledge that the Petitioner was a creditor of
the estate (P. 3, J[5 and 6). On September 4, 1987, the Personal
Representative began publication of notice to creditors to file
claims, which publication continued through September 18, 1987 (P. 3
1(4) .

The published

notice was given pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated, §75-3-801, as it existed at that time.

That statute

read as follows:
Unless notice has already been given under this Section,
a personal representative upon his appointment shall
publish a notice once a week for three successive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
announcing his appointment and address and notifying
creditors of the estate to present their claims within
three months after the date of the first publication of
notice or be forever barred. (Emphasis added).
Charter was not given actual notice of the running of the
claim bar (P.4, f8), nor did Charter have actual knowledge of the
published notice (P.3 and 4, | 7 ) . Charter filed a claim, but it
was not filed within three (3) months of publication (P.4, f9).
7

Petitioner's

late

filed

claim

was

denied

by

the

Personal

Representative, whereupon Charter Thrift & Loan petitioned the
District Court for allowance of its claim pursuant to §75-3-806,
Utah Code Annotated,

The District Court, the Honorable Judge

Wilkinson presiding, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and based thereupon denied Petitionees claim in reliance on
the following conclusion of law:
The constitutional due process rights of the creditor,
Charter Thrift & Loan, were not violated because said
creditor had received actual notice of the Decedent's
death, the filing of the probate, and the appointment of
Shelly J. Jones as Personal Representative.
(See, Addendum Exhibit "A" at f3) .
As set forth below, this conclusion of law is erroneous
because knowledge or notice of death, appointment of a personal
representative or commencement of a probate is not the equivalent
of actual notice of the commencement of the three (3) month claim
period.

Further, the published notice of the claim period is

constitutionally insufficient to trigger the three (3) month time
bar of the nonclaim statute to bar claims of known creditors which
have not received actual notice of the running of the claim bar
period.

Therefore, the District Court erred in denying Charter's

Petition to Allow its Claim against the estate. This error denied
Charter its constitutional rights of due process, and should be
reversed with directions to allow Charter's claim.
8

ARGUMENT
I.
A.

A CREDITOR IS ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS BEFORE ITS CLAIM
MAY BE BARRED IN A PROBATE PROCEEDING
The Requirement to Satisfy Constitutional Guaranties
of Due Process Applies in Probate Proceedings
Due to State Action

The application of the guaranties of due process under the
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, and Utah Constitution,
Article 1, Section 7, are based upon the fact that a probate action
necessarily involves the State through its judicial branch. Since
the Personal Representative acts based upon its appointment under
an Order of Court, all actions of the Personal Representative
regarding claims are subject to Court review.

The finding that a

probate proceeding involves State action was made by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Tulsa Professional Collection
Services vs. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (1988).

In determining that the

requirements of due process were involved in the barring of claims
in a probate proceeding, the Supreme Court considered numerous
factors which are set forth below.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Probate proceedings, triggering the nonclaim statute, can
only be commenced by petitioning the Court;
The Court is required to set a hearing date on the
petition;
Notice is required to be sent to all heirs,
legatees and devisees;
The Court will admit the will to probate on the
testimony of one subscribing witness;
After being admitted to probate, the Court will
appoint an executor and issue letters testamentary;
9

6.

Immediately after appointment, the executor or
executrix is required to give notice to the
creditors of the deceased; and
Proof of compliance with such requirement must be
filed with the Court.

7.

Id. at 134L.
Each of the steps set forth above are required by the Utah
Probate Code and were taken by the Personal Representative in the
present action.

It was based upon these factors that the United

States Supreme Court in Pope determined that the guaranty of due
process was applicable in the application of the claim bar period
under the Probate Code.
court

is

intimately

The Supreme Court stated, "The probate

involved

throughout,

involvement, the time bar is never activated".

and

without

that

Id. at 1345.

Further, the Supreme Court noted that the Oklahoma nonclaim
statute

"directs the executor or executrix to publish notice

'immediately' after appointment".

Id. at

1346.

Therefore, "due

process is directly implicated and actual notice generally is
required."

id.

There is no distinction between the Utah Probate

Code and the Oklahoma Probate Code.

In fact, the United States

Supreme Court referred to the Utah statute as a comparative
statute. Id. at 1347. Consequently, the guaranties of due process
also apply in the application of the claim bar period as it relates
to Charter's claim against the estate of Glenn Claughton Anderson.

10

The same considerations of due process are also considerations
under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. While there are
very few Utah cases construing the due process requirements under
the Utah Constitution, it is clear that the considerations of due
process under the Utah Constitution are the same as those under the
United States Constitution.

See, Vali Convalescent & Care Inst.

vs. Ind. Com'n of Utah, 649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982); and Untermyer vs.
State Tax Commission, 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942).

As under the

United States Constitution, the Utah Constitution guaranties due
process by providing the opportunity to be heard when a property
right may be affected.

See, Wells vs. Children's AID Society of

Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).

Therefore, the Constitutional

considerations of due process set forth in Pope should also be
applied by this Court under the Utah Constitution, Article I,
Section 7.
B.

Due Process Requires Actual Notice of the Event Which
Will Adversely Affect a Property Right

As set forth above, the District Court found that due process
had been satisfied because Charter Thrift & Loan had actual notice
of the death, the existence of the probate and the appointment of
the personal representative.

However, it is Charter's position

that this is an erroneous conclusion of law and is therefore a
manifest error which should be reversed.

Due process under the

United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, and the Utah Constitution,
11

requires that actual notice of the running of the non-claim bar
period be provided.

Notice of other facts related to the probate

proceeding are not sufficient to insure due process in the barring
of claims.
In Pope, the Supreme Court held that known or reasonably
ascertainable creditors must have actual "notice by mail or other
means as certain to insure actual notice."

Id. at 1348.

By so

ruling, the Supreme Court clearly was requiring actual notice of
the event which would cut-off or "adversely affect" the property
right.

Id.

In this instance, the event was the running of the

claim bar period.

In so ruling, the Supreme Court found that

notice which was only published in accordance with the applicable
statute was insufficient to bar the claims of creditors which were
reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative because
publication was not reasonably calculated to provide notice.
at 1347.
In summary, the Supreme Court stated:
We hold that Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is not a selfexecuting statute of limitations. Rather, the statute
operates
in
connection
with
Oklahoma's
probate
proceedings to "adversely affect" appellant's property
interest. Thus, if appellant's identity as a creditor
was known or "reasonably ascertainable", then the Due
Process Clause requires that the appellant be given
"notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure
actual notice". (citation omitted).
Id. at 1348.
12

Id.

Based upon the Pope decision, it is apparent that the prior
Utah statute, under which the Appellee operated, requiring only
published notice, is violative of due process and cannot suffice to
activate the three (3) month time bar.
creditor of the estate.

Petitioner was a known

Consequently, Petitioner was entitled to

actual written notice, by mail or other comparable means, of the
commencement of the three (3) month period for presentation of
claims before its claim could be barred.

As no such notice was

given, Petitioner's claim should not have been barred. Therefore,
the District Court erred and its ruling should be reversed and
remanded with directions to allow the claim.
TT,

THE NOTICE TO WHICH PETITIONER IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENTITLED IS NOTICE OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
THREE (3) MONTH CLAIM PERIOD OF THE NONCLAIM STATUTE

The United States Supreme Court in the Pope case ruled that a
non-self-executing nonclaim statute, which does not require actual
notice to known creditors, is unconstitutional as violative of due
process.

The rationale is that it is violative of due process to

deprive a party of a property right through State action

without

actual notice. The Supreme Court was solely considering the effect
of a published notice to present claims.

Logic dictates that the

actual notice which a party must receive, as a result of the
decision in the Pope case, is notice to present claims or be

13

barred, which notice will trigger the nonclaim statute, thereby
depriving a creditor of its property.
A. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Notice of
Death and Commencement of Probate was Constitutionally
Sufficient Under the Due Process Clause
The lower court erred in its conclusion of law that notice of
death and of the commencement of probate through the appointment of
a personal representative satisfies the due process requirements.
Notice of a decedent's death is irrelevant.

Upon an individual's

death, a probate proceeding may never be started, no personal
representative appointed and therefore the nonclaim statute would
never be triggered.

Similarly, the appointment of a personal

representative does not trigger the nonclaim statute.

Though a

personal representative is appointed, the personal representative
may never take the steps necessary to trigger the nonclaim statute.
Consequently, the petitioner's knowledge of the appointment of a
personal representative is irrelevant.
The fact of which a known creditor must have notice is the
commencement of the extremely brief three

(3) month statutory

period within which claims must be filed or barred. Actual notice
to present claims is the only event which can constitutionally
trigger the nonclaim statute and thereby satisfy due process
concerns. Careful examination of the Pope case in conjunction with

14

the Oklahoma statute which was under scrutiny, supports this
fundamentally logical position.
The statutes which were under review were Oklahoma statutes,
Title 58, §331-333, 1981. The Supreme Court ruled that the notice
required by §331 was constitutionally insufficient on due process
grounds because it did not provide for actual notice to known
creditors.

The Oklahoma statute required only that notice of the

claim bar period to be published in some newspaper printed in the
county.
Consequently, the actual notice to which the Supreme Court was
referring was notice of the commencement of the claim period. This
is further supported by the simple logic resulting from the fact
that the petitioner in the Pope case admittedly had knowledge of
the decedent's death.
In Pope, the Supreme Court ignored the fact that the creditor
had actual notice of the death. The petitioner was a creditor with
actual knowledge of the fact that the deceased had passed away. In
fact, the creditor was the assignee and a subsidiary of the
hospital where the deceased had passed away and was presenting a
claim for the hospital's expenses of the deceased's final illness.
Id. at 1344.

It was in the context ol «i known creditor which had

actual knowledge of the death of the decedent, that the Court found

15

that the creditor was still entitled to actual notice of the
running of the claim bar period.
Finally, the petitioner in the Pope case filed its claim a
full four

(4) years after the published notice to creditors.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the nonclaim statute and
the published notice provided for therein was unconstitutional as
it was not sufficient to protect the due process rights of
creditors.

Therefore, the

constitutionally

barred

petitioner's

through

claim

application

could

of the

not be

defective

statute, even though a substantial period of time had expired since
the creditor became aware of the death and even though it effected
the administration of the estate.
Immediately after the United States Supreme Court handed down
the Pope ruling, the 1989 session of the Utah Legislature amended
§75-3-801 to add the following sentence:
The personal
representative
shall, after making
reasonable efforts to ascertain creditors of the estate,
also mail such notice on or before fourteen (14) days
after the date of first publication to all then known
creditors of the estate.
It is apparent from the text of the Pope opinion, as well as
from the actions of the Utah Legislature that the prior Utah
statute, requiring only published notice, is violative of due
process and cannot suffice to bar known creditor's claims.

It is

a rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed
16

to be aware of judicial rulings effecting statutes.
Yakima Public School No, 7., 533 F
Presumably,

the

Utah

State

Lvnes vs.

140 (Wash. App. 1975).

legislature

recognized

the

unconstitutionality of the prior statute and amended it with the
intent to make the notice requirement conform to the requirements
of the Pope ruling.
Petitioner was

a known creditor

of the estate

and

was

therefore entitled to actual notice by mail, or other means equally
certain to ensure actual notice, of the commencement of the three
(3) month period for presentation of claims.
given

and

Charter's

claims

should

not

No such notice was
have

been

barred.

Consequently, the lower Court erred in barring Charter's claims,
which decision should be reversed.
B.

Inquiry Notice is Not Sufficient

It appears that the implication of the District Court's ruling
is that a creditor with knowledge of the death and

of the

appointment of the personal representative should make further
inquiries as to whether the claim bar period is running. However,
inquiry notice is not sufficient to meet the requirements of due
process.

This is supported by the simple language of the Pope

decision which required "actual notice11

It is further supported

by other recent decisions in analogous situations where property
rights were being extinguished by state action.
17

In the case of City of New York vs. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co..
73 S.Ct. 299 (1953), a railroad was being reorganized pursuant to
the Bankruptcy Act.

Pursuant to that proceeding, certain liens

which the City of New York had on property owned by the railroad
were extinguished and action thereon was barred by the City's
failure to present its claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at
3 00.

However, the City of New York received no copy of the Bar

Order and had to rely for notice on publication in the Wall Street
Journal.

JEd. The City of New York had actual knowledge that the

proceedings had been commenced. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that
the city was still entitled to actual notice that its claims were
going to be barred.
Nor can the bar order against New York be sustained
because of the city's knowledge that reorganization of
the railroad was taking place in the court. The argument
is that such knowledge puts a duty on creditors to
inquire for themselves about possible Court orders
limiting the time for filing claims. But even creditors
who have knowledge of a reorganization have a right to
assume that the statutory "reasonable notice11 will be
given them before their claims are forever barred.
Id. at 301.

Thus, inquiry notice was not sufficient to justify

extinguishment of a property right by Court action.
A comparable result was reached by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Reliable Elec. Co., Inc. vs. Olson
Const. Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).
the

issue was once again the barring
18

In the Reliable case,
of a claim

against a

bankruptcy
creditor

estate,
was

proceedings.

in the absence

informed

of

Id. at 621.

the

of notice.

initiation

of

In Reliable,
the

the

Chapter

11

This is comparable to the present matter

in which the petitioner had notice of the death of the decedent, as
well as the appointment of a personal representative.

However, the

bankruptcy estate failed to give the creditor in Reliable notice of
the confirmation hearing.

Under the circumstances, the Court ruled

that the due process rights of the creditor had been violated.
as much

as Olson was deprived

of the opportunity

"In

to comment

on

Reliable's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, it was denied due
process of law."

Id. at 622.

The Reliable case is analogous to the present matter in yet
another way.
statutorily

In Reliable, the bankruptcy
required

notice.

compliance with statutory

The

Court

requirements

estate had
went

on

to

given
rule

is not sufficient

the
that

if the

statute does not satisfy due process requirements.
However, we hold that notwithstanding the language of
Section 1141, the discharge of a claim without reasonable
notice of the confirmation hearing is violative of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. at 623.
The same result was reached in In Re Herd, 840 F.2d 757 (10th
Cir.

1988) .

obviously

In this

bankruptcy

case

the

creditor

received

erroneous notice w 1 Ii c 1 :i 11 Ie lower court determined

them on notice to inquire concerning further matters,
19

an
put

id. at 758.

The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit ruled that:
Inquiry notice of the bar date, in this situation, is not
enough: ...actual knowledge of the filing of a bankruptcy
does not negate the statutory notice requirements nor
does it place a duty on creditors to inquire regarding
the time limitations for filing claims.
...Written
notice of the bar date for filing claims should be clear
and definite, not abstract and ambiguous.
Id. at 759, 760.
The same result was obtained in the context of a tax sale of
real property.

In Walker vs. City of Hutchinson, 77 S.Ct. 200

(1956), the interest of a property owner in his property was being
effected by condemnation proceedings.

The statute in question

permitted notice to be given either "in writing. . . or by one
publication in the official city paper...11 Id. at 201. Though the
city gave published notice, so as to satisfy the statute, the
Supreme Court ruled that this was violative of due process.

The

Supreme Court so ruled in reliance on the case of Mullane vs.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950).
Measured by the principles stated in the Mullane case, we
think that the notice by publication here falls short of
the requirements of due process. It is common knowledge
that mere newspaper publication rarely informs the land
owner of proceedings against his property. In Mullane we
pointed out many of the infirmities of such notice and
emphasized the advantage of some kind of personal notice
to interested parties. In the present case there seems
to be no compelling or even persuasive reasons why such
direct notice cannot be given. Appellant's name was
known to the city and was on the official records. Even
a letter would have appraised him that his property was
about to be taken and that he must appear if he wanted to
be heard as to its value.
Id. at 202.

Like the landowner in Walker, Charter's identity was known to
the personal representative and actual written notice of the
running of the claim bar period could have been given.
Finally, in Mennonite BD. of Missions vs. Adams, 103 S.Ct.
2706 (1983), the same result was reached on Fourteenth Amendment
due process grounds, in the context of a tax sale.

In the

Mennonite decision, all required statutory notices were given.
These included posted and published notice. Jd. at 2708. Further,
this included actual mailed notice to the property owner of record.
However, the mortgagee, the appellant in Mennonite, received no
notice other than the published and posted notice.

Under these

circumstances, the Court ruled that:
When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is
publicly recorded, constructive notice by publication
must be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee's
last-known available address or by personal service.
Id. at 2711.
The Court went on to state that knowledge of a delinquency in
the payment of taxes, which could be described as inquiry notice,
was not sufficient.

Id. at 2712.

Again, the Supreme Court in

Mennonite so ruled on the basis of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in reliance on Mullane.
CONCLUSION
It is beyond realistic dispute that the Pope decision requires
that, in order to comply with constitutional guaranties of due
21

process, a known creditor in a probate proceeding is entitled to
receive actual notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure
actual notice of the running of the claim bar period.
undisputed

that

the

only

notice

provided

by

representative in this matter was by publication.

the

It is
personal

It is also

undisputed that Charter Thrift & Loan was a known creditor.

The

lower court erred in concluding that Charter's knowledge of the
Decedent's death and appointment of a Personal Representative was
constitutionally sufficient to bar Charter's claims. The fact that
Charter may have had knowledge sufficient to allow it to make
inquiry wasn't a proper basis upon which to find that due process
was satisfied. Charter Thrift & Loan was constitutionally entitled
to actual notice by mail or other reasonable means of commencement
of the three (3) month period within which to file claims before
its claim could be barred.
Therefore, Charter Thrift & Loan respectfully requests this
Court to reverse the Judgment of the District Court and rule that
Charter Thrift & Loan was entitled to receive actual notice to
present its claims, and since such notice did not take place, its
claim has not been barred.

Further, this Court should remand this

matter to the lower court directing that Charter's claim against
the estate be allowed, plus awarding its attorney's fees and costs
incurred in presenting this appeal, as allowed by the attorney's
22

fees provision of Charter's contract with the deceased.

Rule 34,

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Dixon vs. Stoddard, 765 P.2d
879, 881 (Utah 1988).
DATED this H

day of April, 1991.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

M#rk/S. Swan
Attorney for Charter Thrift
& Loan

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Zt*

day of April, 1991, I caused

a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the
following parties by placing the same in the United States Mails,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Shelly J. Jones, Personal Representative
29 39 Brookburn Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
S. Dee Long
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Appellee

Ch732418.c91
23

ADDENDUM

24

EXHIBIT "A"

Mark S. Swan - 3873
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN £ OVERHOLT, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Copper State Thrift & Loan

RUED MSTMCT HURT
Third Judicial District

S E P - 4 B9Q
bALtLAKfcGOJfilY
DmjtvCtortt

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

f

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, :
JR. ,
: Probate No. P-87-816
Deceased*
Judge Homer Wilkinson
The Petition of Allowance of Claim of Charter Thrift & Loan
against the estate of the above-named Decedent, and the Personal
Representative's denial of that claim came on for hearing on the
25th day of July, 1990, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
Creditor Charter Thrift & Loan appeared through their counsel, Mark
S. Swan of the law firm RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C, and the
Personal Representative appeared through her counsel, S. Dee Long.
The Court having considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted
by the various parties, and being fully advised herein, now makes
its:

F I N D I N G S O F FACT
1
19th d a y

The D e c e d e n t , G l e n n C l a u g h t o n Anderson, Jr., died on t h e
of July,

1987 and w a s a resident

of

Salt

Lake

County,

S t a t e of U t a h ,
2.

A pi obate was filed In the Third Judicial

District Court

of Salt Lake County, State; of Utah on the 12th day of August, 1987,
for the p r o b a t e of D e c e d e n t ' s W i l l .
3.

Decedent's

daughter , Shelly

J,

Jor ies,

was

appointed

Personal R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of said e s t a t e .
4.

Said Personal R e p r e s e n t a t i v e caused a notice to c r e d i t o r s

to be p u b l i s h e d for t h r e e
Utah C o d e A n n o t a t e d .
5.
contacted

(3) c o n s e c u t i v e weeks in a c c o r d a n c e with

§75-3-801.

Said Persoi ia] R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Shelly J". J o n e s , p e r s o n a l l y
Charter Thrift

& Loan by telephone and

informed

him

of

h e r f a t h e r ' s d e a t h , and that a p r o b a t e had been filed, and that she
had b e e n a p p o i n t e d P e r s o n a l Representat I ve of her fat* iei ' s e s t a t e .
6.

C h a r t e r T h r i f t & Loan did not have actual notice of t h e

p u b l i c a t i o n of the N o t i c e to c r e d i t o r s to submit c l a i m s nor actual
n o t i c e of the r u n n i n g of the claim bar per iod.
7.

Charter Thrift

w i t h i n the three

& Loan did

not

file a c r e d i t o r ' s

(3) m o n t h s of p u b l i c a t i o n as required by

claim

U.C.A.,

§ 7 5 - 3 - 8 0 1 , and did not file a c r e d i t o r ' s claim until March l, 1 9 9 0 .
From the forgoing
ii iter s i t s :

Find i n g s of Fact, the C o u r t now m a k e s
'

• .

and

CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction of both the parties and the

subject matter.
2.

The

Personal

Representative

of the

estate met all

requirements of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in giving notice to
creditors,
3.

The constitutional due process rights of the creditor,

Charter Thrift & Loan, were not violated because said creditor had
received actual notice of the Decedent1s death, the filing of the
probate, and the appointment

of Shelly J- Jones as Personal

Representative,
4.

The creditor's claim of Charter Thrift & Loan was not

made within the statutory three month time period of the date of
first publication of notice to creditors as required by law, and
is

thus

forever

barred

against

the

estate,

the

personal

representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent.
DATED this

*f

day of M ^ e t f 1990.
BY THE COURT:

prf

A^KV^^TT

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

S. Dee Long

(S

y

J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on the _

_ day of August

2 990, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
M a :i 1 s, postage prepa id, addressed as fol 1 ows:
Shelley J. Jones, Personal Repr esentat i ve
2939 Brookburn Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
S. Dee Long
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Personal Representative

ch730700.c90

Mark S. Swan - 3873

™ro Judicial Dfrtrict

Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN t OVERHOLT, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)539-8632
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
Copper S t a t e T h r i f t & Loan

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

L
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, :

)

ORDER

GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, :
JR. ,
: Probate No, P-87-816
Deceased•
Judge Homer Wilkinson
The hearing on the Petition of Charter Thrift & Loan for
Allowance of Claims, and the denial of said claim by the Personal
Representative of the estate, came on for hearing on the 25th day
of July, 1990, before the Honorable Hcmer F. Wilkinson.

Charter

Thrift & Loan appeared by and through its counsel, Mark S. Swan of
the

law

firm

RICHER,

SWAN

& OVERHOLT, P.C.

The

Personal

Representative of the estate appeared through her counsel and
counsel for the estate, S. Dee Long.

The Court having considered

all documents on file herein, having reviewed the memoranda and
affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard argument of
counsel, having heretofore signed and filed its Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law# and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the creditor's claim of
Charter Thrift & Loan against the above-named Decedent's estate is
hereby disallowed and forever barred against the estate, the
Personal Representative and the heirs and devisees of the decedent.
DATED this

(J- day of te*£t, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

•3/

/T&-

A/M

. Dfee Long

(/

^

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 1990, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Shelley J, Jones, Personal Representative
2939 Brookburn Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
S. Dee Long
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Personal Representative
Ch730700.c90

